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I.

INTRODUCTION

I
O
W
I

n early 2018, the media began to report that the United States was debating whether to “react to some nuclear or missile test with a targeted strike
against a North Korean facility to bloody Pyongyang’s nose and illustrate the
high price the regime could pay for its behavior.”1 This article asks a simple
question: would such a “bloody nose strike” (BNS) violate international law’s
rules on the use of force, the jus ad bellum?
Unfortunately, providing a coherent answer is complicated by the lack
of clarity surrounding the United States’ planning of such a strike. In particular, the government has not specified what kind of provocation it would
consider sufficient to justify a BNS, has not identified precisely what a BNS
would entail, and has not offered a legal theory for why a BNS would be
permissible under international law. To some extent, therefore, this article is
inherently speculative.
Because so much is unknown, the following legal analysis proceeds on
two assumptions. The first is that the United States would attempt to justify
a BNS either as the collective self-defense of Japan, its ally most directly
threatened by North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests, or on the basis of its
own individual right of self-defense. The second is that a BNS would be a
response to one of two North Korean provocations that have taken place
over the past couple of years: (1) a test of nuclear weapon on North Korean
territory, or (2) the intentional launch of an unarmed ballistic missile into
Japan’s territorial waters.2
The article itself is divided into four parts. Part II asks whether either
North Korean provocation would qualify as an “armed attack,” the necessary precondition of individual or collective self-defense. Part III analyzes
what would be required for the United States to justify a BNS as the collective self-defense of Japan. And Part IV discusses whether the United States
1. Gerald F. Seib, Amid Signs of a Thaw in North Korea, Tensions Bubble Up, WALL STREET
JOURNAL (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amid-signs-of-a-thaw-in-northkorea-tensions-bubble-up-1515427541.
2. See Michael Schmitt & Ryan Goodman, Best Advice for Policymakers on “Bloody Nose”
Strike against North Korea: It’s Illegal, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.
org/51320/advice-policymakers-bloody-nose-strike-north-korea-illegal/. North Korea has
also fired multiple unarmed missiles through Japan’s airspace. Because there is no relevant
difference between such launches and launching an armed missile into Japan’s territorial
waters (which necessarily involves invading Japan’s airspace), I will address only the latter
type of launch.
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could justify a BNS as its own individual self-defense. Throughout this analysis, the article assumes that there are no relevant differences between conventional and customary international law concerning the use of force.3
II.

ARMED ATTACK

In order for the United States to invoke either collective or individual selfdefense, a BNS would have to be a response to an armed attack (or what is
believed to be an armed attack) by North Korea. To constitute an armed
attack, one of the North Korean provocations would have to qualify as (1) a
use of force that is (2) particularly grave.
A. Use of Force
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides that “[a]ll Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”4 Because a use of
force must have an interstate element,5 a nuclear test on North Korean territory would not represent a use of force within the meaning of Article
2(4)—and thus could not justify self-defense under Article 51.6
That does not mean, however, that such tests are lawful. To begin with,
as I have explained elsewhere,7 the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty8 by 168 States,9 including by the vast majority of States
3. See, e.g., Oliver Dörr, Prohibition of Use of Force, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 10 (Sept. 2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.
1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e427 (“It is submitted . . . that the prohibition of the use of force is today both a norm of treaty law and of international customary
law and that both rules are, at least in general, identical in content.”).
4. U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
5. See Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 21 (“Art. 2 (4) UN Charter prohibits the use of force solely
in the international relations between States. It does not, therefore, apply to the use of military force within the territory of a State . . . .”).
6. U.N. Charter art. 51.
7. Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected States and the Formation of Custom, 112 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (2018).
8. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 1439 (1996) (not yet in force).
9. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI4&chapter=26&clang=_en (last visited Feb. 6, 2020).
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that can be considered specially affected with regard to nuclear weapons,
means that customary international law likely prohibits all nuclear testing,
regardless of location.10
It is also possible that North Korea’s nuclear testing runs afoul of Article
2(4)’s prohibition on the threat of force. The question here, following the
International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion, is why North Korea engages in such testing:
In order to lessen or eliminate the risk of unlawful attack, States sometimes
signal that they possess certain weapons to use in self-defence against any
State violating their territorial integrity or political independence. Whether
a signalled intention to use force if certain events occur is or is not a
“threat” within Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter depends upon various
factors. If the envisaged use of force is itself unlawful, the stated readiness
to use it would be a threat prohibited under Article 2, paragraph 4. Thus it
would be illegal for a State to threaten force to secure territory from another State, or to cause it to follow or not follow certain political or economic paths.11

North Korea clearly views its nuclear arsenal as a way of deterring States,
particularly the United States, from attacking it.12 But experts agree that
North Korea also uses nuclear testing to coerce States like South Korea and
Japan to adopt political and economic policies that are friendlier—or at least
less hostile—to it.13 The latter purpose likely renders the testing an unlawful
threat of force.
A strong case can be made, then, that North Korea’s nuclear testing,
despite taking place on its territory, is a wrongful act that gives rise to its
international responsibility.14 As a result, injured States—at a minimum those
10. It is possible, of course, that North Korea should be considered a persistent objector to that prohibition. See Heller, supra note 7, at 240.
11. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
Rep. 226, ¶ 47 (July 8); see also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 269 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua] (noting
that “in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the
State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State
can be limited, and this principle is valid for all States without exception”).
12. STEPHEN BLANK, A WAY OUT OF THE NORTH KOREAN LABYRINTH 3 (2014).
13. Id.
14. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, [2001] 2
YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION pt. 2, 32, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
4
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specially affected by the nuclear testing, whether because they suffer the environmental impact of the testing or are the targets of the coercion it represents15—are entitled not only to demand that North Korea cease testing,16
but also to engage in countermeasures designed to induce North Korea to
comply with its international obligations.17
The right to engage in countermeasures, however, would not justify a
U.S. BNS against North Korea, whether as an act of collective or individual
self-defense. Article 50 of the Articles on State Responsibility make clear that
“[c]ountermeasures shall not affect . . . the obligation to refrain from the
threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.” 18
Indeed, given the analysis below,19 a BNS in response to a nuclear test on
North Korean territory would itself qualify as an armed attack, entitling North
Korea to use force against the United States in self-defense.
The use of force analysis is very different for the launch of an unarmed
missile into Japan’s territorial waters. The critical issue here, given that such
a launch necessarily affects Japan’s territorial integrity, is whether Article 2(4)
implicitly contains a gravity requirement that might not be satisfied by the
launch of a single unarmed missile into an area devoid of people and objects.
There is some support for a gravity requirement in the legal scholarship and
in the practice of international organizations. Corten, for example, has argued that “there is a threshold below which the use of force in international
relations, while it may be contrary to certain rules of international law, cannot
violate article 2(4).”20 Similarly, the Independent International Fact-Finding
Mission on the Conflict in Georgia has claimed that Article 2(4) excludes
incidents such as “the targeted killing of single individuals, forcible abductions of individual persons, or the interception of a single aircraft,” because
the “prohibition of the use of force covers all physical force which surpasses
a minimum threshold of intensity.”21
15. Id. art. 42(b)(i).
16. Id. art. 30.
17. Id. art. 49.
18. Id. art. 50(1)(a).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 39–52.
20. OLIVIER CORTEN, THE LAW AGAINST WAR 55, 77 (2010); see also Mary Ellen
O’Connell, The Prohibition on the Use of Force, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 89, 102 (Nigel D. White & Christian Henderson eds., 2013)
(“Article 2(4) is narrower than it might appear on its face. Minimal or de minimis uses of force
are likely to fall below the threshold of the Article 2(4) prohibition.”).
21. 2 REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL FACT-FINDING MISSION ON
THE CONFLICT IN GEORGIA 242, 242 n.49 (2009).
5
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The idea that Article 2(4) implicitly contains a gravity requirement, however, is difficult to reconcile with the provision’s travaux préparatoires, which
indicate that it was intended to be “an absolute all-inclusive prohibition.”22
Moreover, as Ruys has shown, States have routinely invoked Article 2(4) in
response both to limited military confrontations between States23 and to
small-scale military incursions that did not meet with armed resistance.24 In
the latter situation, the critical factor determining international reaction has
been the presence or absence of hostile intent. States have generally refrained
from invoking Article 2(4) when an incursion was either accidental, such as
soldiers unknowingly crossing an international border, or intentional but not
intended to harm the territorial State, such as an aircraft crossing an international border to avoid bad weather.25 By contrast, they have been quick to
invoke Article 2(4) whenever an incursion was deliberate and in any way
threatening—even in situations involving a single aircraft or a single ship.26
The best interpretation of the prohibition of the use of force is thus the
one offered by Dörr:
In relation to small-scale intrusions of a military character it is decisive to
determine whether they reflect a hostile intent on the part of the intruder.
Other than that, no specific gravity threshold can be read into Article 2(4)
UN Charter nor be shown to exist in the customary practice of States.27

By this standard, North Korea firing an unarmed missile into Japan’s territorial waters would qualify as a use of force as long as North Korea intended

22. 6 DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 334–35 (1945).
23. See Tom Ruys, The Meaning of “Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are
“Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded From UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 159, 183–87 (2014).
24. See id. at 189–90.
25. See, e.g., “Force Majeure” and “Fortuitous Event” as Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness:
Survey of State Practice, International Judicial Decisions and Doctrine – Study Prepared by the Secretariat,
[1978] 2 YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, pt. 1, 61, 99–104, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A 1978/Add.l (Part 1).
26. Ruys, supra note 23, at 189.
27. Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 19; see also Ruys, supra note 23, at 189 (“[A]n unlawful territorial
incursion, even if small in scale, that reflects a manifest hostile intent may come within the
ambit of Article 2(4), irrespective of whether the territorial state choses to respond by
force.”).
6
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the missile to breach Japan’s territorial sovereignty, as has been the case for
all previous launches through Japan’s airspace.28
There is, however, one lingering question: Is firing an unarmed missile
into a depopulated area an act “of a military character”? Or is it closer to
political or economic coercion, which both the context29 and drafting history30 of Article 2(4) indicate are excluded from the prohibition of the use of
force?31 Schmitt and Goodman seem to take the latter position when they
argue that an unarmed missile does not qualify as a weapon when fired into
an area devoid of people or objects.32 Their argument implies that such an
act would not qualify as a use of military force under Article 2(4) even if the
necessary hostile intent is present.33
I disagree, as it seems clear from State practice that “military character”
refers to the nature of the actor using force, not the act itself. In other words,
an act has a military character when a State’s armed forces engage in the act,
regardless of the specific form the act takes. To be sure, Dörr persuasively
argues that it is possible to imagine an extraterritorial act involving a State’s
armed forces that would violate the principle of non-intervention but not
the prohibition on the use of force, such as unarmed soldiers delivering humanitarian assistance to civilians without the territorial State’s consent.34
Such acts are excluded from Article 2(4), however, not because they do not
have a military character, but because they lack hostile intent. An unarmed
missile deliberately fired by North Korea’s armed forces into Japan’s territorial waters would thus clearly be an act of a military character, even if the
missile was unarmed and not a “weapon” as that term is usually understood.

28. North Korea has never claimed that any of the breaches of Japan’s airspace were
accidental.
29. See, e.g., Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 11
Paragraph 7 of the Preamble of the UN Charter identifies as one of the goals of the United
Nations ‘to ensure . . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest’, and
Art. 44 shows that the UN Charter uses the term ‘force’ where it refers to the application
of military force.

30. See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF
TRANSNATIONAL. LAW 885, 905 (1999) (noting that States refused to adopt proposals to
include political and economic coercion within Article 2(4)).
31. See, e.g., Ruys, supra note 23, at 163 (“It is generally accepted that [Article 2(4)] extends to armed force only.”).
32. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 19.
7
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The growing acceptance of the idea that cyberattacks can violate Article
2(4) supports this conclusion. Cyberattacks involve neither “armed” force,
in the literal sense of the term, nor even kinetic force, which is why both
States and scholars were originally skeptical that they qualify as uses of force
under Article 2(4).35 The more modern position, however, is that a cyberattack “specifically intended to directly cause physical damage to tangible property or injury or death to human beings is reasonably characterized as a use
of armed force and, therefore, encompassed in the prohibition.”36 As with
the unarmed missile, the determinative factor is hostile intent, not the extent
of the tangible damage caused by the cyberattack.
B. Grave Use
The more difficult question is whether North Korea launching an unarmed
missile into Japan’s territorial waters qualifies not only as a use of force, but
also as an “armed attack” on Japan. Reeves and Lawless say yes;37 Schmitt
and Goodman say no.38 Schmitt and Goodman have the stronger argument.

35. See, e.g., William C. Banks & Evan J. Criddle, Customary Constraints on the Use of Force:
Article 51 with an American Accent, 29 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67, 88
(2016) (“The traditional and dominant view is that the prohibition on the use of force and
right of self-defence apply to armed violence, and only to interventions that produce physical damage. Under the traditional standard, most cyber-attacks will not violate Article 2(4),
and thus do not enable Article 51 self-defence.”).
36. Schmitt, supra note 30, at 913; see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 88 (5th ed. 2011) (“[T]he term ‘force’ in Article 2(4) must denote violence.
It does not matter what specific means – kinetic or electronic – are used to bring it about,
but the end result must be that violence occurs or is threatened.”); Dörr, supra note 3, ¶ 12
(“[C]omputer network attacks intended to directly cause physical damage to property or
injury to human beings in another State may reasonably be considered armed force.”).
37. Shane Reeves & Robert Lawless, Is There an International Legal Basis for the ‘Bloody
Nose’ Strategy?, LAWFARE (Jan.19, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/there-international-legal-basis-bloody-nose-strategy (“[A]nother North Korean test in which it launches
an unarmed missile into Japanese sovereign territory . . . could reasonably be interpreted as
an armed attack.”).
38. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2
[I]f intentionally launched with the foreseeable result that the missile would land in a populated area and harm individuals or property with a significant scale and effect, then the
operation might qualify as an armed attack regardless of whether it carried a warhead. But
that is not the case here.
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1. Is There a Gravity Threshold?
There are two interrelated issues here. The first is whether all uses of force
qualify as armed attacks. The United States itself—to quote Harold Koh during his tenure as the Legal Advisor to the State Department—“has for a long
time taken the position that the inherent right of self-defense potentially applies against any illegal use of force. In our view, there is no threshold for a
use of deadly force to qualify as an ‘armed attack’ that may warrant a forcible
response.”39 Some scholars agree.40
For multiple reasons, however, that position is difficult to defend. To
begin with, as Ruys points out, “the different wording used in Article 2(4)
UN Charter and Article 51 strongly suggests that ‘armed attack’ has a narrower scope than ‘use of force.’”41 That implication, in turn, is supported by
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, which specifically adopts a gravitybased distinction between the use of force and aggression in two contexts:
Security Council determinations that aggression has not taken place42 and
indirect aggression.43 Moreover, “throughout the negotiations, numerous
countries stressed that only the ‘most serious’ uses of force qualified as
‘armed attacks’” for self-defense in general.44 Indeed, State practice generally
reflects that there is a gap between “mere” uses of force and armed attacks,
even if States do not want to set the armed attack threshold too high.45
The ICJ has also consistently emphasized that not all uses of force qualify as armed attacks. In Nicaragua, the court famously opined that only “the
most grave forms of the use of force” qualify as armed attacks.46 The Court
reaffirmed that distinction in Oil Platforms, holding that the Iranian incidents

39. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, Remarks at the
USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept.
18, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/197924.htm.
40. See, e.g., ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
HOW WE USE IT 251 (1994).
41. TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER:
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 148 (2013).
42. G.A. Res. 3314, annex, art. 2, Definition of Aggression (Dec. 14, 1974).
43. Id. art. 3(g) (deeming an act of aggression “[t]he sending by or on behalf of a State
of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above”).
44. RUYS, supra note 41, at 150.
45. Id. at 155.
46. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 191.
9
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in question, even if viewed cumulatively, did not amount to a “most grave”
use of force and thus could not be considered an armed attack.47
2. Distinguishing “Mere” Uses of Force
The critical issue regarding the definition of an armed attack, therefore, is
the nature of the distinction between “ordinary” and “most grave” uses of
force, not whether such a distinction exists. The distinction cannot turn on
whether the use of force in question was accompanied by hostile intent, because we have seen that the presence or absence of such intent is what determines whether a small-scale territorial incursion qualifies as a use of force
in the first place. Instead, the distinction is based on the “scale and effects”
of the hostile use of force, the factor the ICJ emphasized in Nicaragua.48
Whereas any deliberate military incursion into another State’s territory
qualifies as a use of force, even one that causes no harm, only a deliberate
military incursion that is at least capable of causing harm to people or property
qualifies as an armed attack.49 An armed attack has thus taken place either
when a hostile use of force actually causes such harm50 or at least would have
caused such harm had the attack succeeded as planned. The former situation
is obvious; the latter is illustrated by two unsuccessful operations cited by
47. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161, ¶ 64 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms].
48. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 195 (distinguishing between “a mere frontier incident”
and an armed attack).
49. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 36, at 195 (defining an armed attack as “a use of force
producing (or liable to produce) serious consequences, epitomized by territorial intrusions,
human casualties or considerable destruction of property”); RUYS, supra note 41, at 155
(“[C]ustomary practice suggests that, subject to the necessity and proportionality criteria,
even small-scale bombings, artillery, naval or aerial attacks qualify as ‘armed attacks’ activating Article 51 UN Charter, as long as they result in, or are capable of resulting in destruction
of property or loss of lives.”).
50. See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, Armed Attack, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW, ¶ 10 (Oct. 2013), https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e241
In sum, it is submitted that regardless of the dispute over degrees in the use of force, or
over the quantifiability of victims and damage, or over harmful intentions, an armed attack
even when it consists of a single incident, which leads to a considerable loss of life and
extensive destruction of property, is of sufficient gravity to be considered an ‘armed attack’
in the sense of Art. 51 UN Charter.

RUYS, supra note 41, at 152 (“When a State’s territory or its external manifestations abroad
become the target of artillery shelling, air strikes, bombings and the like, there is in principle
little doubt that such attacks reach the necessary gravity to qualify as ‘armed attacks.’”).
10
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Ruys in which the international community nevertheless implicitly accepted
that the State using force had engaged in an armed attack: Iraq’s intercepted
attempt to assassinate President Bush in Kuwait in April 1993, and Yemen’s
attack on Harib Fort in 1964, which killed only a few camels.51
Given this understanding of gravity, it is clear that North Korea deliberately launching an unarmed missile into Japanese territorial waters would not
qualify as an armed attack against Japan. As Schmitt and Goodman note, “if
intentionally launched with the foreseeable result that the missile would land
in a populated area and harm individuals or property with a significant scale
and effect, then the operation might qualify as an armed attack regardless of
whether it carried a warhead.”52 Deliberately launching an unarmed missile
into the sea (or through airspace), however, is not capable of causing harm
to people or property. It is thus no more than a prohibited use of force.
3. Accumulation of Events
Although that conclusion is sound, it does not end the analysis of whether
North Korea would commit an armed attack against Japan if it fired another
unarmed missile into Japan’s territorial waters. One use of force might not
be enough to qualify as an armed attack, but what about a series of them?
After all, North Korea has launched multiple missiles into Japan’s territorial
waters or through its airspace in the past few years alone.
This possibility implicates the so-called “accumulation of events” doctrine, one version of which53 holds that “a number of incidents emanating
from the same source and within a similar timeframe, which alone might not
have met the threshold for an armed attack, might be considered in combination as an armed attack.”54 The ICJ has implicitly endorsed the accumulation of events doctrine, at least in principle, in three cases: Nicaragua,55 Oil

51. See RUYS, supra note 41, at 153.
52. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
53. A second form, relevant to the permissibility of anticipatory self-defense, is discussed below. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
54. COMMITTEE ON THE USE OF FORCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, FINAL
REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE 7 (2018) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT ON
AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE].
55. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 231 (asking whether a series of incursions into the territories of Honduras and Costa Rica could be treated “as amounting, singly or collectively, to
an armed attack”).
11
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Platforms,56 and Armed Activities.57 Moreover, States have often invoked the
doctrine to justify their self-defensive acts without encountering significant
resistance from the international community.58
Although he does not explicitly invoke the accumulation of events doctrine, Dunlap suggests that it is defensible to view each of North Korea’s
missile launches as part of an “extended attack operation” on Japan:
To me, the context matters: a single, isolated launch of a missile that’s
somehow known to be unarmed is one thing, but a pattern of launches
from a rogue regime issuing repeated threats about nuclear attacks is something quite different. . . . It’s a fairly standard military tactic to induce complacency in your opponent by employing ruses and feints as a part of an
extended attack operation. (This is especially so in Soviet military theory which still seems to dominate North Korean thinking.) Let’s ask ourselves, can we really be sure that we’re not we witnessing something like
that with the North Koreans? Are these repeated launches of “unarmed”
missiles part of a sophisticated North Korean operation (already underway?) which is intended to lull the U.S. and its allies into thinking the missile launches are merely harmless “tests”?59

By contrast, Schmitt and Goodman dismiss any attempt to rely on the accumulation of events doctrine in the North Korean context, arguing that “unless it could be reasonably concluded that subsequent missile tests would be
conducted and that a forceful response would be necessary to stop them,”
such tests could not “be treated as one in a series of actions that constitute
an on-going campaign that in its entirety constitutes an armed attack.”60
Schmitt and Goodman’s position is more persuasive. Although the accumulation of events doctrine is designed to permit a defensive response to
a “continuous, overall plan of attack purposely relying on numerous small
56. Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 64 (considering, but ultimately rejecting, the idea that
the Iranian attack in question “either in itself or in combination with the rest of the ‘series .
. . of attacks’ . . . can be categorized as an ‘armed attack’ on the United States”).
57. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda),
Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19) [hereinafter Armed Activities] (“[E]ven if this
series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as cumulative in character, they still remained
non-attributable to the DRC.”).
58. RUYS, supra note 41, at 172.
59. Charlie Dunlap, The “Bloody Nose” Strategy Debate: Why It’s More Complicated than Some
Think, LAWFIRE (Jan. 24, 2018), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2018/01/24/the-bloodynose-strategy-debate-why-its-more-complicated-than-some-think/.
60. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
12
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raids”61—generally similar to Dunlap’s characterization of the missile
launches—the doctrine “does not relieve the defending State of its duty to
demonstrate that it has actually been the victim of the use of armed force.”62
There is simply no evidence that North Korea’s unarmed missile launches
have been part of an “extended attack operation” designed to make a harmful launch possible by lulling Japan and the United States into a false sense
of security.
Dunlap’s interpretation might be plausible if Japan had stopped shooting
down North Korean missiles once they realized they were unarmed. But Japan has never tried to intercept one of the missiles, despite having the weaponry necessary to do so,63 which means that North Korea has always been
free to successfully fire an armed missile at Japan. Indeed, Dunlap acknowledges that North Korea could attack Japan even without aiming directly at
the Japanese mainland, because a nuclear weapon would likely cause significant damage if detonated over Japan’s territorial waters.64 That possibility
undermines any claim that the missile launches are somehow part of a “continuous, overall plan of attack” that would justify a defensive response. Instead, they are best understood as discrete uses of force that do not qualify
as armed attacks either individually or collectively.
4. Knowledge
The armed attack analysis conducted above, however, assumes that Japan
knows North Korea’s missiles are unarmed. An armed missile fired into Japan’s territorial waters would obviously qualify as an armed attack, thus en61. Barry Levenfeld, Israel’s Counter-Fedayeen Tactics in Lebanon: Self-Defense and Reprisal
Under Modern International Law, 21 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 7 n.18
(1982).
62. RUYS, supra note 41, at 174. The ICJ emphasized the lack of evidence for the United
States accumulation of events claim in the Nicaragua case. See Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 231
(“Very little information is available to the Court as to the circumstances of these incursions
or their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to decide whether they may be
treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or collectively, to an armed attack by Nicaragua on either or both States.”).
63. Alex Lockie, Japan May Have No Choice but to Shoot Down the Next North Korean Missile
Test, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.nl/japan-us-shootdown-next-north-korean-missile-test-2017-8?international=true&r=U.S..
64. Dunlap, supra note 59 (“If even one ‘test’ missile turned out to be the real thing,
how much damage could it do if it exploded not on Japan’s mainland but only over its
territorial sea? Maybe a lot.”).
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titling Japan to shoot down the missile in self-defense. Although the boundaries of interceptive self-defense are blurry, it is “uncontested” that, at a minimum, it permits intercepting a weapon that is not under the control of a
human being, such as a missile.65
To date, Japan has assumed that each of the missiles North Korea has
launched through its airspace or into its territorial waters has been unarmed.
But what if it believed—as opposed to knew—that a particular missile was
armed? Would that belief entitle Japan to act in self-defense (and thus the
United States to act in collective self-defense, as discussed below)?
This is a difficult question, but the better answer is that it would. As Ruys
states, “[a]t the strategic level, the distinction between (admissible) interceptive and (inadmissible) pre-emptive self-defence is determined by and large
by the irreversibility of the opponent’s conduct.”66 In the context of a frontier incident, the invaded State will normally be able to delay a response until
it has taken steps to determine whether the invading State is acting with hostile intent. That will not be the case, however, with a missile that has already
been launched and may be armed. In that situation, not taking immediate
steps to intercept the missile could have catastrophic consequences. The territorial State should thus be entitled to assume that the missile constitutes an
armed attack and defend itself accordingly.
III.

COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE

Unless the United States acted in response to an armed attack on its interests,
a BNS on North Korea would have to be justified as the collective self-defense of Japan. Such a collective self-defense claim raises two issues: (1) a
procedural issue concerning whether Japan would have to specifically request the United States to defend it; and (2) a substantive issue concerning
the scope of the permissible response.
A. Procedure
Any discussion of collective self-defense in the form of a BNS assumes that
one of North Korea’s missile launches qualifies as an armed attack on Japan.

65. RUYS, supra note 41, at 347.
66. Id. at 356.
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If a State is not entitled to act in individual self-defense, collective self-defense of that State is unlawful.67 As we have seen, although an unarmed missile fired into Japan’s territorial waters does not objectively qualify as an
armed attack, Japan would be entitled to assume that it was being attacked if
it believed a missile was armed. In such a situation, Japan would be fully
entitled to request the United States come to its defense. Article 51 of the
U.N. Charter specifically endorses collective self-defense, and there is no requirement in international law that a State engaging in collective self-defense
has its own individual right of self-defense.68
But what if, in response to an armed attack, Japan did not ask for U.S.
assistance? Or what if Japan explicitly rejected it? Would the United States
still be entitled to act in the “collective self-defense” of Japan?
Under customary international law, it is clear that collective self-defense
is permissible only when the attacked State expressly requests assistance. The
ICJ made that requirement clear in Nicaragua:
At all events, the Court finds that in customary international law, whether
of a general kind or that particular to the inter-American legal system, there
is no rule permitting the exercise of collective self-defence in the absence
of a request by the State which regards itself as the victim of an armed
attack. The Court concludes that the requirement of a request by the State
which is the victim of the alleged attack is additional to the requirement
that such a State should have declared itself to have been attacked.69

The ICJ reaffirmed the requirement of an express request both in Oil Platforms70 and (slightly more obliquely) in Armed Activities.71
67. See, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 156 (4th
ed. 2018).
68. See, e.g., George K. Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What
the Treaties Have Said, 72 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 365, 383 (1998) (“Although it has
been argued that an assisting State must have substantive rights or interests affected by an
attacking State’s action, or that an assisting State must have an individual right of self-defense, neither is a prerequisite for coming to the aid of a target State.”).
69. Nicaragua, supra note 11, ¶ 199.
70. Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 51 (“Despite having referred to attacks on vessels and
aircraft of other nationalities, the United States has not claimed to have been exercising collective
self-defence on behalf of neutral States engaged in shipping in the Persian Gulf; this would have
required the existence of a request made to the United States ‘by the state which regards itself as
the victim of an armed attack.’”).
71. Armed Activities, supra note 57, ¶ 128 (“Article 51 of the Charter refers to the right
of ‘individual or collective’ self-defence. The Court notes that a State may invite another
State to assist it in using force in self-defence.”).
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State practice also overwhelmingly supports the express-request requirement, from Jordan and Lebanon’s requests for help against the United Arab
Republic in 1958 to Iraq’s much more recent request for help against the
Islamic State. Indeed, as Gray has pointed out, “in every case where a third
state has invoked collective self-defence it has based its claim on the request
of the victim state, even where there was no express treaty provision requiring this.”72
It is also worth noting that both the United States and Japan accept the
requirement of an express request. According to the U.S. Army’s Operational
Law Handbook, “[t]o constitute a legitimate act of collective self-defense, all
conditions for the exercise of an individual State’s right of self-defense must
be met, along with the additional requirement that assistance must be requested by the victim State.”73 Japan has consistently taken this position.74
A number of scholars have argued, however, that the customary expressrequest requirement is superseded by Article V of the 1960 Mutual Cooperation Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America, which provides that “[e]ach Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party
in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to
its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”75 According to Sari and Nasu, for example, Article V means that
an armed attack on Japan would not only impose an obligation on the
United States to adopt appropriate measures, but it would also confer upon
it a right to take forcible action without the need for a specific Japanese
request to this effect, even where Japan is prevented from taking action in
its individual self-defense for domestic legal or political reasons.76

72. GRAY, supra note 67, at 187.
73. INTERNATIONAL AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL’S LEGAL CENTER & SCHOOL, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 5 (18th ed. 2018)
[hereinafter OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
74. See, e.g., Masahiro Kurosaki, The ‘Bloody Nose’ Strategy, Self-Defense and International Law:
A View from Japan, LAWFARE (Feb. 15, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/bloody-nosestrategy-self-defense-and-international-law-view-japan.
75. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan
art. V, 11 U.S.T. 1632 (Jan. 19, 1960) [hereinafter Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security].
76. Aurel Sari & Hitoshi Nasu, Collective Self-Defense and the “Bloody Nose Strategy”: Does it
Take Two to Tango?, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/51435/
collective-self-defense-bloody-nose-strategy-tango/.
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Reeves and Lawless agree.77
This interpretation of the Mutual Cooperation Treaty is untenable. To
begin with, it is inconsistent with Article IV of the Treaty, which provides
that “[t]he Parties will consult together . . . whenever the security of Japan or
international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.”78 As Kurosaki
has pointed out, the consultation requirement “remains applicable even in
the case of U.S. collective self-defense” of Japan.79 Moreover, Article VII of
the Treaty explicitly states that it “does not affect and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the
Charter of the United Nations”80—obligations that include the requirement
of an express request for assistance.81 And finally, Kurosaki notes that “Japan’s consistent position has instead been that the treaty only authorizes the
United States to use force in collective self-defense where Japan exercises its
right of individual self-defense in consultation with the United States.”82 Indeed, Japan has taken that position specifically with regard to North Korea’s
missile launches.83
B. Substance
Even if we assume that Japan would be willing to ask the United States to
help defend it against an armed North Korean missile, it is unclear whether
the United States would be entitled to do so through a BNS. All States, including the United States,84 accept that collective self-defense cannot exceed
the permissible defensive response by the attacked State. What a State cannot
do singly, States cannot do collectively. A BNS against North Korea would
be lawful, therefore, only if Japan would be entitled to engage in the same
kind of strike in response to an armed missile launch.

77. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37 (arguing that “[t]his treaty may provide a basis for
the United States’ to engage in a limited retaliatory strike” even in the absence of an express
Japanese request for assistance).
78. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 75, art. IV.
79. Kurosaki, supra note 74.
80. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, supra note 75, art. IV.
81. Kurosaki, supra note 74.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 5 (“To constitute a legitimate
act of collective self-defense, all conditions for the exercise of an individual State’s right of
self-defense must be met.”).
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Because Japan would be entitled to engage in interceptive self-defense
while an armed North Korean missile (or a missile reasonably believed to be
armed) was in the air, there is no reason why it could not ask the United
States to shoot the missile down for it. But that is not what the United States
means by a BNS, which, by all accounts, would involve destroying a target
on North Korean territory. Collective self-defense would justify that kind of
strike only if Japan was entitled to use force against a North Korean target.
Considering each North Korean missile launch separately, it is difficult
to see how Japan could justify that kind of response. As Ruys notes,
[i]t is generally accepted in customary practice and legal doctrine . . . that
measures should be geared towards the halting or repelling of an armed
attack and should not exceed this goal. Otherwise, the action undertaken
will involve a punitive or retaliatory character and will be qualified as a reprisal, rather than as self-defence.85

In media res, therefore, Japan would be entitled to intercept a missile, but not
to strike the military installation in North Korea from which the missile was
launched. The latter response would be retaliation, not prevention, and thus
an illegal reprisal.
The same limitation would not apply, however, if Japan had reason to
believe that an intercepted (or completed) North Korean attack portended
the imminent launch of subsequent armed attacks. In such a situation—
which is not the same as “true” anticipatory self-defense, where the State
ostensibly defending itself has never been the victim of an armed attack86—
Japan would not only have the right to act pre-emptively,87 it would also be
entitled to use whatever force was necessary to prevent the future attacks:

85. RUYS, supra note 41, at 94; see also GRAY, supra note 67, at 150 (noting that commentators widely agree “self-defence must not be retaliatory or punitive; the aim should be
to halt and repel an attack”).
86. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54,
at 11; JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 165 (2004) (“Many commentators would argue that, when an armed attack has occurred and there is the possibility of more such actions, anticipatory self-defence is not the
issue.”).
87. See, e.g., RUYS, supra note 41, at 106 (“In all, customary practice indicates that if a
State has been subject not to an isolated attack, but to a series of armed attacks, and if there
is a considerable likelihood that more attacks will imminently follow, then self-defence is
not automatically excluded.”); Ashley S. Deeks, Taming the Doctrine of Pre-Emption, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 661, 663–64 (Marc
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There is . . . significant support and practical reason to accept that the UN
Charter should be read as accepting that self-defence measures may take
into account the need to ensure that the attacker has not simply momentarily refrained from operations while the attacks are in fact set to continue
in the near future. It would appear therefore that while self-defence cannot
justify “all-out” war to destroy the enemy, the forcible measures can include the need to defend the State from the continuation of attacks, and
not only repel the attack of the moment.88

Presumably, defending against “the continuation of attacks” by North
Korea would require Japan to eliminate, or at least substantially degrade,
North Korea’s ability to launch armed missiles at it. Japan could thus request
the United States assist it in that endeavor as collective self-defense.
The problem here, of course, is a factual one. To date, North Korea has
not launched an armed attack against Japan, via missile or otherwise. That
does not mean Japan could not attack a military installation in North Korea
that was about to launch an armed missile, but Japan’s evidentiary burden89
to prove an armed attack was imminent would be difficult to satisfy. A State
that has never been the victim of an armed attack should be held to a higher
standard of proof regarding imminence than a State that has already been
attacked.90 At this point, Japan still faces the more significant evidentiary

Weller ed., 2015) (“To some extent, all uses of force in self-defence in response to a completed armed attack have an anticipatory element in them. That is, for force to be ‘necessary’,
the victim state must anticipate that the attacker has the capacity and intent to strike again.”).
88. FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, at 11; see
also Roberto Ago, Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1980] 2 YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION pt. 1, 69, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1980
If . . . a State suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another
State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that the victim State is not
free to undertake a single armed action on a much larger scale in order to put an end to this
escalating succession of attacks.

GARDAM, supra note 86, at 161 (“[W]hen dealing with a series of attacks, the scale of the
action taken to repulse such a series of attacks may differ from that which would be appropriate in response to an isolated armed attack.”).
89. The State acting in self-defense always has the burden of proving the existence of
an armed attack. See, e.g., Oil Platforms, supra note 47, ¶ 51. The standard of proof is unclear,
but many scholars have endorsed a “clear and compelling evidence” requirement. See, e.g.,
RUYS, supra note 41, at 509.
90. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54,
at 7 (“The accumulation of smaller attacks may, however, be relevant from the point of view
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burden, and as noted earlier, there is no indication that North Korea views
its missile launches as anything more than saber-rattling. Unless that changes,
there is no plausible legal basis for Japan to ask the United States to help it
do anything more than intercept a North Korean missile it fears might be
armed.
IV.

INDIVIDUAL SELF-DEFENSE

It is also possible that the United States could launch a BNS not in collective
self-defense of Japan, but on the basis of its own individual right of selfdefense. Dunlap has made that argument,91 as have Reeves and Lawless.92
A. Armed Attack
The problem here is finding a North Korean armed attack—actual or potential—that would justify the United States launching a BNS in self-defense.
Scholars have identified two possibilities, but neither is convincing.
The first, offered by Dunlap, is that North Korea’s missile launches into
Japan’s territorial waters constitute an armed attack on the U.S. soldiers
based in Japan. As he puts it, the United States “has more than 54,000 of its
own reasons to unilaterally act in self-defense.”93
There is no question that the use of force against the external manifestations of a State, such as soldiers and military installations, can trigger the
right of self-defense. Resolution 3314, for example, deems aggression “[a]n
attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces . . . of
another State.”94 But even if it is possible to view North Korea’s missile
launches as an armed attack, that attack is directed at Japan, not at the United
States, because there is no evidence that North Korea is trying to harm U.S.
of anticipatory self-defence insofar as these incidents might in some circumstances support
the case for likelihood of an imminent attack.”).
91. Dunlap, supra note 59
In my view, if force is used against Japan that would otherwise permit an Article 51 response, it is quite likely that it’s not necessary for the U.S. to wrestle with the intricacies of
the law of collective self-defense, as there are plenty of American military assets—not to
mention thousands of U.S. citizens—in Japan to defend.

92. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37 (“Even without another missile targeting Japan,
the United States could arguably rely on its own Article 51 individual right of self-defense
to justify a ‘bloody nose’ strike.”).
93. Dunlap, supra note 59.
94. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 422, annex, art. 3(d).
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soldiers or damage U.S. military installations. Unintentionally causing harm
to a State’s people or property is not enough to satisfy the hostile-intent requirement; the attacking State must deliberately use force against the affected
State.95 So, although North Korea would be internationally responsible for
any damage a missile attack on Japan might accidentally cause the United
States’ external manifestations, a forcible U.S. response would constitute an
armed attack against North Korea and trigger North Korea’s own right of
self-defense.
The second possibility, defended by Reeves and Lawless, is that the totality of North Korea’s nuclear activities indicates that it intends to eventually
attack the United States, thus entitling the United States to defend itself now
via a BNS:
North Korea’s recent activities help support a pre-emptive self-defense argument. Despite extensive efforts by the international community, including through diplomacy, negotiations, collaboration, and sanctions, North
Korea continues to defiantly test powerful nuclear weapons and launch
ballistic missiles. Furthermore, it has gone to great lengths to conceal its
nuclear testing program by creating underground facilities and intricate
tunnel systems. This behavior, coupled with North Korea’s pattern of aggressive rhetoric and threats against the United States and other nations,
makes a pre-emptive use of force seem more and more necessary.96

This argument is neither factually nor legally convincing. To begin with,
Kim Jong-un’s bluster notwithstanding, there is no evidence that North Korea would ever use a nuclear weapon against the United States. To the contrary, as noted earlier, scholars overwhelmingly agree that North Korea’s nuclear program is designed to deter attacks against it and to coerce other
States, particularly North Korea’s regional neighbors, into adopting more
favorable political and economic policies.97
Even if North Korea did have offensive intentions toward the United
States, that would still not justify the United States launching a BNS now. As
Reeves and Lawless openly acknowledge, any such strike would be an act of
pre-emptive self-defense, because a North Korean armed attack on the
United States—particularly a nuclear one—cannot be said to be imminent,
95. See RUYS, supra note 41, at 160 (“The concept of ‘animus aggressionis’ is therefore best
construed as requiring the deliberate use of armed force against another State or its external
manifestations, or, in other words, a hostile intent.”).
96. Reeves & Lawless, supra note 37.
97. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
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“leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.”98 Moreover,
given that a BNS would not be a reaction to a previous North Korean attack,
the United States could not even plausibly argue that the Caroline standard
should be somewhat relaxed to take into account a series of previous North
Korean armed attacks.
Whatever uncertainty exists about the meaning of imminence, particularly in U.S. practice,99 it is beyond doubt that “true” pre-emptive self-defense is unlawful. Although the international community is deeply divided
over many important jus ad bellum issues, the unlawfulness of pre-emptive
self-defense is not one of them. Unsurprisingly, the 125 members of the
Non-Aligned Movement, those States most likely to be the targets of force,
categorically reject any attempt to expand self-defense to include pre-emptive situations.100 But it is not just weaker States in the Global South that
reject this position: nearly all powerful States believe that pre-emptive selfdefense is unlawful, including the five permanent member States of the U.N.
Security Council.101 Even the United States rejects pre-emptive self-defense,
stating categorically in the Operational Law Handbook that force “employed to
counter non-imminent threats . . . is illegal under international law.”102 It is
not surprising, therefore, that States claim a right of pre-emptive self-defense
only as a last resort, preferring instead to describe their uses of force, however unpersuasively, as reactions to imminent armed attacks.103 After all, the
one unabashed invocation of pre-emptive self-defense, by Israel following
98. The Caroline standard, quoted in R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 82, 92 (1938). Although the text of Article
51 limits self-defense to armed attacks that have occurred or are ongoing, post-Charter State
practice supports the idea that self-defense is permissible in response to imminent armed
attacks. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT ON AGGRESSION AND THE USE OF FORCE, supra note 54, at
13 (“[T]here would seem to be increasing support for the view that the right to self-defence
does exist in relation to manifestly imminent attacks, narrowly construed.”); Zemanek, supra
note 50, ¶ 4 (“On balance the majority opinion accepts nevertheless that a manifestly imminent armed attack which is objectively verifiable, i.e., an attack in progress, falls within the
meaning of Art. 51 UN Charter.”).
99. See, e.g., Banks & Criddle, supra note 35, at 75 (noting that “[o]ver time, the U.S.
government has endorsed an increasingly capacious definition of ‘imminence’, treating credible threats of future attacks as ‘imminent’ even if the nature and timing of the anticipated
attacks are uncertain and, in significant respects, hypothetical”).
100. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 170 (“The Non-Aligned Movement continues to argue
that Article 51 ‘is restrictive and should not be re-written or re-interpreted.’”).
101. See, e.g., Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
102. OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 73, at 7.
103. See GRAY, supra note 67, at 170–71.
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its 1981 attack on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq, was unanimously condemned by the Security Council without even a single abstention.104
No dispassionate observer would deny that North Korea’s nuclear program poses a serious threat to international peace and security. But that does
not mean North Korea intends to attack either the U.S. homeland or the
U.S.’s external manifestations, much less imminently. It is not possible to
infer the intention to attack from the mere capacity to do so.105 Accordingly,
even in light of numerous North Korean missile launches into Japan’s territorial waters and through Japanese airspace, North Korea’s nuclear activities
would not justify the United States launching a BNS against targets on North
Korean territory.
B. Proportionality
Because there is no plausible basis for considering a North Korean missile
launch into Japan’s territorial waters as an armed attack on the United States,
the United States could not justify a BNS against North Korea on the basis
of its individual right of self-defense. It is nevertheless worth considering
what kind of BNS would be proportionate to a hypothetical North Korean
armed attack against either the United States or Japan. The ICJ has repeatedly made clear that proportionality is an essential requirement of any selfdefensive act, although, as Christodoulidou and Chainoglou have noted, its
approach to the principle “could be described as confusing, if not phobic,
due to the Court’s reluctance to define or even analyse the dimensions of
proportionality in jus ad bellum.”106
Among the scholars who have written on the legality of a BNS, only
Schmitt and Goodman have specifically addressed proportionality. Their position is quite restrictive:
Proportionality would cap any defensive response at the level needed to
compel North Korean [sic] to do so. The “limited” nature of the bloody
nose strategy may sound positive in this regard, but if the targets of the
strikes are nuclear-related facilities or other critical assets, the risk that the
104. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
105. Cf. id. (noting that “it is the armed attack against the United States that must be
imminent before resorting to force anticipatorily, not the mere acquisition of the capacity
to attack”).
106. Theodora Christodoulidou & Kalliopi Chainoglou, The Principle of Proportionality
from a Jus Ad Bellum Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE USE OF FORCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 87, at 1187, 1189.
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situation would escalate, rather than diminish, would, as a matter of law,
auger against acting in self-defense. Even without contemplating possible
escalation, it is hard to see how a U.S. military strike on a nuclear facility
would be proportionate to an unarmed projectile dropping in Japanese waters.107

The analysis above supports Schmitt and Goodman’s position in terms of a
single missile launched into Japan’s territorial waters. If the missile was unarmed, the launch would not qualify as an armed attack, making any “defensive” response an armed attack in its own right. If the missile was armed,
although Japan would be entitled to defend itself and to ask the United States
for assistance, the individual or collective response could not go beyond interceptive self-defense without constituting an unlawful reprisal.
The legality of a BNS changes, however, if we imagine—very counterfactually—that the first missile, whether armed or unarmed, signals the imminent launch of a second armed missile against Japan or the United States.
In that case, as noted earlier, there would be nothing disproportionate about
the United States (acting individually or in collective self-defense of Japan)
going beyond interceptive self-defense and eliminating North Korea’s ability
to launch subsequent missiles. Indeed, it would not matter whether the imminent second attack would involve a nuclear or conventionally armed missile. Either way, eliminating North Korea’s offensive capacity would be proportionate. As Ago wrote long ago, if a State
suffers a series of successive and different acts of armed attack from another State, the requirement of proportionality will certainly not mean that
the victim State is not free to undertake a single armed action on a much
larger scale in order to put an end to this escalating succession of attacks.108

That said, an imminent second attack would not give the United States
carte blanche to engage in a BNS—not even if it limited its choice of targets to
legitimate military objectives. The BNS would be lawful self-defense only if
it targeted the specific installations involved in the kind of attack that North
Korea was threatening to launch immediately. It could not target military
objectives that had no nexus to the imminent attack:

107. Schmitt & Goodman, supra note 2.
108. Ago, supra note 88, at 69.
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[T]he exercise of the right to self-defense must not be a mere motive for
military sanctions, since otherwise the exercise of the right to self-defense
would amount to nothing but hidden armed counter-measures, which . . .
are illegal under international law. In particular, the actions allegedly taken
in the exercise of the right to self-defense must, by their very nature, be
able to diminish the military abilities of the aggressor and to induce the
enemy not to continue its attack.109

V.

CONCLUSION

Although there is no question that North Korea’s nuclear testing and missile
launches are deeply concerning, experts on both the left and the right agree
that a BNS on North Korean territory would be both politically and militarily
disastrous. That is reason enough to oppose any such strike.
This article has provided an additional reason for opposition: namely,
that a BNS would categorically violate the prohibition of the use of force,
one of the most fundamental norms of international law.110 North Korea’s
nuclear testing may violate its international obligations, but it does not
amount to an armed attack on Japan or the United States. And although it is
possible to imagine future missile launches that would permit the United
States to engage in more than interceptive self-defense on behalf of Japan,
there is no evidence that North Korea has any intention of actually attacking
either Japan or the United States—particularly not with a nuclear-armed missile. The sooner the United States abandons any thought of launching a BNS
against North Korea, therefore, the better.

109. Andreas Zimmermann, The Second Lebanon War: Jus ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and the
Issue of Proportionality, 11 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 99, 123
(Armin von Bogdandy et al. eds., 2007); see also RUYS, supra note 41, at 108 (“[I]t is not
sufficient that the target is a legitimate military objective; it must also be connected with the
force to be repelled.”).
110. See, e.g., Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, [1966] 2 YEARBOOK
OF
THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 187,
247,
U.N.
Doc.
A/CN/SER.A/1966/add.1 (“The Commission pointed out that the law of the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous example of a
rule in international law having the character of jus cogens.”).
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